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THE ADMINISTRATIVE EVASION OF
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
Philip Hamburger *
ABSTRACT: Administrative power does profound harm to civil
liberties, and nowhere is this clearer than in the administrative
evasion of procedural rights. All administrative power is a mode of
evasion, but the evasion of juries, due process, and other procedural
rights is especially interesting as it most concretely reveals the
administrative threat to civil liberties.
In contemporary doctrine, due process and most other
procedural rights are understood mainly as standards for
adjudication in the courts. Traditionally, however, they were
understood, at least as much, to bar adjudication outside the courts.

Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor of Law Columbia Law School, and President
of the New Civil Liberties Alliance. I am deeply grateful for the valuable comments I
received from Brian Richman and from the participants in the 2017 conference on
Rethinking Due Process at the Center for the Study of the Administrative State at
Antonin Scalia Law School.
*

915

916

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 11:915

That is, they were understood to block evasions of the courts and
their procedural rights. Nonetheless, administrative power evades
procedural rights—not only in agency tribunals but also in the courts
themselves.
The resulting administrative adjudication gives the government
ambidextrous paths for enforcement. And it thereby transforms
procedural rights from constitutional guarantees into mere options
for government power.
Turning to theory, this argument about procedural rights is part
of a broader thesis about the nature of administrative power. Current
doctrine and scholarship presents administrative power as an
expression of law, but it makes much more sense to understand it as
power—a sort of power that flows in a cascade around pre-existing
structures and rights, whether established by the Constitution or the
Administrative Procedure Act. Despite its pretense of being
administrative “law,” it really is a mode of evasion.
Overall, the administrative evasion of procedural rights
illustrates how seriously administrative power threatens civil
liberties. Whatever one thinks of administrative power as a structural
or sociological matter, it is also a civil liberties problem.
INTRODUCTION
As 2016 wound down, the administrative law judges (ALJs) at
the Securities and Exchange Commission had issued more than 150
decisions.1 The year before, they racked up more than 200 decisions
before celebrating New Year’s Eve. 2 These individuals work hard,

ALJ Initial Decisions Archive 2016, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.
gov/alj/aljdec/aljdecarchive/aljdecarc2016.shtml (last modified Dec. 1, 2017).
2 ALJ Initial Decisions Archive 2015, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/
alj/aljdec/aljdecarchive/aljdecarc2015.shtml (last modified Sept. 9, 2016).
1
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and they are fine exemplars of the devoted people who serve in a
judicial capacity within federal agencies.
Exactly what they do, however, deserves more attention. When
the SEC charges an individual with securities fraud, it can choose to
proceed in the courts—by bringing a civil enforcement action or by
referring the case to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution.
Either way, the defendant enjoys the full range of the Constitution’s
procedural protections. But the commission also has the option to
charge defendants administratively, before its administrative law
judges. And when it thus pursues a case in-house, rather than in the
courts, the defendant does not get a jury, a real judge, or the real due
process of law.
In fact, at a host of agencies, administrative adjudication
bypasses some of the most basic procedural rights. The Constitution
protects some substantive rights—famously, the freedoms of speech
and religion. Most of its guarantees of liberty, though, secure judicial
procedures, such as juries and the due process of law. Any one of the
procedural rights may, to some observers, seem a mere technicality.
But taken together, they are the primary constraint on how the
government proceeds against Americans in particular instances—
forming a crucial barrier to government misconduct. Nonetheless,
administrative adjudication largely evades such rights.
Significance. The administrative evasion of procedural rights is
revealing about both administrative power and about procedural
rights. It shows how much procedural rights have been eviscerated,
even to the point of being transformed from constitutional
guarantees to mere government options; and it thereby shows how
profoundly administrative power threatens civil liberties.
Administrative power is a means of binding Americans—that is,
of imposing legal obligation on them—in ways that run outside the
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Constitution’s pathways for binding legislation and adjudication. 3
Of course, this is not to say that administrative power is usually
unauthorized by acts of Congress or the courts, but rather that it
allows the government ultimately to bind Americans with other sorts
of acts.4 And when the government escapes the courts by binding
Americans through administrative adjudications, it largely evades
the Constitution’s procedural rights.
This Article focuses on the administrative evasion of procedural
rights, because this sort of evasion most concretely reveals the
administrative threat to civil liberties. When administrative power is
understood in merely structural terms about separation of powers or
checks and balances, or in sociological terms about the regulatory

PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 387 (2014) (showing how
the first substantive word of the Constitution, “All,” confined lawmaking to
Congress).
This understanding of administrative power—as a power that binds, in the sense of
imposing legal obligation—is not the only conception of administrative power.
Defenders of administrative power (such as Kenneth Davis, Jerry Mashaw, Eric
Posner, Cass Sunstein, and Adrian Vermeule) have often taken a much broader view
of it, in which it includes not only binding but also non-binding edicts (such as those
distributing benefits and instructing executive officers to exercise lawful force), and
on this basis they cite eighteenth-century federal statutes on benefits, etc., to justify
binding twentieth-century administrative rules and adjudications. See HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? at 83 (and works cited there). So broad a conception
of administrative power, however, confuses the executive power that has always been
lawful in the United States with binding administrative edicts—a sort of power that is
very different. In contrast, in this Article, administrative power is understood to
include only binding power—that is, the power to impose legal obligation.
Of course, at the edges, it can be difficult to discern whether an executive action is
a distribution of a benefit or an imposition of legal obligation—a problem that can be
observed, for example, in federal land management decisions and some licensing. In
this Article on administrative power, however, a basic range of binding administrative
actions should be clear enough—for example, the decisions by administrative law
judges to demand testimony and information, to impose fines, and to bar otherwise
lawful conduct.
4 See HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 3, at 23; Philip
Hamburger, Vermeule Unbound, 94 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 205, 209, 215-17 (2016).
3
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needs of contemporary society, the dangers for constitutional rights
are not always obvious. In contrast, when one focuses on
administrative adjudication and recognizes it as an evasion of the
Constitution’s procedural rights, it becomes painfully clear that
administrative power seriously undermines these freedoms.
Administrative power evades procedural rights not only in
agency tribunals but also in the courts themselves. For example,
Supreme Court doctrine requires judges to accommodate
administrative power by deferring to agencies on both the facts and
the law. As a result, judges deny defendants their right to the
independent judgment of judge and jury, and where the government
is a party, judges engage in systematic bias in its favor in violation of
due process. The evasion thus happens even in the courts.
Functionally, administrative adjudication gives the government
ambidextrous paths for enforcement. It thereby transforms the very
nature of procedural rights—from constitutional guarantees for the
people to mere options for government power.
This Article’s argument about the evasion of procedural rights is
part of a broader, theoretical claim: that the administrative state
needs to be understood not as a type of law, but as power—a sort of
power that serves as a mode of evasion. Current doctrine presents
administrative power as an expression of law, but what really is at
stake here is a type of power—one which flows in a cascade around
the structures and rights established by law, whether the
Constitution or the Administrative Procedure Act.
The evasion of procedural rights is thus sobering, and once it is
understood, the constitutional threat from administrative power
cannot easily be brushed aside. Whatever one thinks of
administrative power as a structural or sociological matter, it is also
a civil liberties problem. And the evasion of procedural rights
illustrates how serious a problem it is.
Prior Scholarship. Thus far, scholars of administrative power have
failed to recognize the extent of the problem. Some critics of
administrative power have drawn attention to the costs for particular
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procedural rights: Gary Lawson and Suja Thomas have pointed to
the loss of jury rights, and Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell
have shown the loss in due process. 5 Nonetheless, the more
structural point about a broad evasion of procedural rights has yet to
be explored.
Interestingly, the defenders of administrative power have long
acknowledged some costs for constitutional rights, but have tended
to speak in coded ways that minimize the loss. Woodrow Wilson
already anticipated that administrative power would override
individual rights, arguing that the “inviolability of persons,” as
protected by a bill of rights, did “not prevent the use of force by
administrative agents for the accomplishment of . . . the legitimate
objects of government.” 6 Frank Goodnow, in even more Germanic
fashion, welcomed administrative power precisely as a means of
suppressing individual freedom. Fearing that an “insistence on
individual rights” could “become a menace when social rather than
individual efficiency is the necessary prerequisite of progress,” he
took satisfaction that “the actual content of individual rights is being
increasingly narrowed” and urged judges to accept administrative
power and the way it “modif[ied] the content of private rights.” 7
Looking back on such developments, a contemporary commentator,
Peter Strauss, observes the judicial “reinterpreting” of “citizens’
rights in light of the changed arrangements.” 8

Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1247 (1994) (regarding deference to agency fact-finding); SUJA A. THOMAS, THE
MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF
THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES 142 (2016); Nathan S. Chapman and Michael
W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012).
6 Notes for Lectures at Johns Hopkins (1891-94), in 7 PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 121–
22 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1969).
7 FRANK JOHNSON GOODNOW, THE AMERICAN CONCEPTION OF LIBERTY AND
GOVERNMENT 21 (1916).
8 PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (2002).
5
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These comments, as far as they go, are suggestive, but they fail
to do justice to the reality of what has happened to procedural rights.
When taking the line that there has been some modification or
reinterpretation of procedural rights, the defenders of administrative
power fail to recognize the breadth and depth of the evasion. Rather
than merely an adjustment of particular rights, administrative
adjudication is a more systemic and thus structural change. It evades
almost all of Constitution’s procedural rights applicable to either civil
or criminal proceedings, and (as will be discussed further below) this
systemic evasion of procedural rights has profound consequences—
not least, by turning guarantees against government into options for
government.
It is therefore all the more disturbing that the Supreme Court not
only participates in the administrative evasion of procedural rights
but also tries to persuade the public that nothing is amiss—for
example, when the Court obscures the loss in freedom with phrases
such as “public rights” and “all the process that is due.” The Supreme
Court thereby papers over the chasm with vapid phrases, and all too
many scholars echo the court. The repetition of legitimizing phrases,
however, cannot cover up the depth of the loss.
Methodology. Although this Article relies on history, including
the history of some rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, its
argument is not originalist; nor is it even about preserving past forms
of adjudication. Instead, it relies on an historical understanding of
constitutional rights as a measure of change—the point being to
reveal the costs resulting from the evasion of procedural rights.
The argument thus leaves room for counterarguments that
constitutionally protected procedural rights have changed. But the
evaded rights are widely considered important; and they are still
recognized in non-administrative cases. It is therefore difficult to
conclude that there is merely a change in the extent of the affected
rights, not an evasion of them.
Indeed, far from focusing on the definitions of particular rights,
this Article (as will be seen in Part IX) argues that the evasion has
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largely converted such rights from constitutional guarantees into
mere government options. This Article’s reliance on history is
therefore not so much about a constitutionally-privileged time (the
founding) as about the loss of constitutionally-privileged
procedures. Whatever the particular definition of procedural rights,
and whether such rights are historical or evolving, the more basic
problem is that the government can simply evade the Constitution’s
procedural rights.
Organization. This Article begins (I) by giving an overview of the
evasion of procedural rights. It then illustrates the problem by
examining (II) juries and (III) due process. These are not the only
possible examples, but they should suffice to show the evasion of
central procedural rights.
Next, this Article considers some excuses for the evasion: (IV)
that administrative adjudication is fair because ALJs are independent
and their process is evenhanded, (V) that administrative adjudication
merely delays procedural rights until defendants appeal to the
courts, (VI) that it comes with expanded procedural rights, and (VII)
that government without such adjudication would be impractical.
All of these excuses turn out to be illusory.
The most sweeping excuse (VIII) is that the constitutional
problems are cured by judicial review. In fact, the administrative
evasion of procedural rights persists in the courts. Administrative
power doubly evades procedural rights, not only in administrative
tribunals but also in the courts themselves.
It thus becomes apparent (IX) that administrative power gives
the government ambidextrous paths for enforcement. And this has
transformed the very nature of procedural rights—changing them
from guarantees for the people into options for the government.
Finally (X) this Article notes that the evasion of procedural rights
fits within a more general thesis that evasion is the defining
characteristic of administrative power. When administrative power
is recognized as an evasion of law (including the courts and their
procedures), its structure and even its trajectory become clear.
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Overall, administrative power is a profound threat to civil
liberties, and nothing makes this clearer than its evasion of
procedural rights.
I. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
Procedural rights have a long history, but much has changed
during the past century or so.
Already at common law, the English developed a wide range of
procedural protections, and eventually they elevated them as
constitutional rights. Jury trials, for example, were not a right when
they emerged in the thirteenth century, but by the eighteenth century
the English widely valued them as an ancient constitutional liberty.9
Americans learned the value of procedural rights by reading the
history of English prerogative power, and they experienced the
contemporary value of procedural rights in the struggles that led up
to their revolution. 10 They therefore enumerated such rights in
detail—initially in their state constitutions and then in the U.S.
Constitution.
The systemic American circumvention of procedural rights came
only much later, with the growth of administrative power. Late
nineteenth-century American progressives tended to have an elitist
disdain for representative government and individual claims of
rights, and they adopted German ideas about administrative power
to get around republican institutions and the procedural rights
protected in the courts. 11 By shifting lawmaking and adjudication

For example, Blackstone wrote about “the constitutional trial by jury.” WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 350 (1768; 1979).
10 For example, prior the Revolution, Americans suffered under the Stamp Act, which
cut off jury rights by shifting proceedings to admiralty courts.
11 HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 3, at 441 (on the
German connection); id. at 466-67 (quoting Wilson and Goodnow on the
9
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into administrative agencies, the government could get around the
paths that the Constitution established for binding lawmaking and
adjudication, as demarcated in the body of the Constitution and its
Bill of Rights.12
As a result, administrative tribunals have become parallel court
systems. Whereas the U.S. Constitution vests the judicial power of
the United States in the courts, Congress has declared that most
administrative agencies can enforce their dictates through their own
tribunals, with their own procedures, which do not match those of
the courts. 13 Of course, agencies can lawfully rely on their own
proceedings to distribute benefits, such as social security, but when
agencies venture into binding adjudications—those that impose legal
obligation—they sidestep the courts and the Constitution’s
procedural rights.14
Admittedly, the Constitution secures different rights for civil and
criminal proceedings, and it can be difficult to determine when
administrative adjudication evades the one set of standards or the
other. Administrative adjudication is often considered civil—as
when the Supreme Court worries about the evasion of Seventh
Amendment right to a jury but not the evasion of Article III and Sixth
Amendment juries. 15 Where, however, administrative power is
designed to penalize or correct, its adjudication often seems criminal
in nature, and it then appears to evade the Constitution’s guarantees

administrative reduction of rights). Somewhat similar developments occurred in other
common law nations, notably England, as relatively educated persons turned to
Continental ideas of administrative power. Id. at 454.
12 Id. at 467.
13 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting judicial power in courts).
14 On the distinction between binding and nonbinding power, see HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 3, at 2-5.
15 See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S.
442 (1977).
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of criminal procedure. To avoid complexity, this Article’s
examples—juries and due process—do not depend on identifying
whether a particular case is civil or criminal in nature. Nonetheless,
the administrative escape from both civil and criminal standards is a
reminder of the evasion’s breadth.
Administrative adjudication is most familiar to Americans from
the Internal Revenue Service. Informally, the IRS can ask a taxpayer
to attend an audit of his returns; more formally, it can summon him
for an examination and thereby demand attendance, testimony, and
records, without a summons, subpoena, or other order from a
judge.16 Serving as prosecutor, jury, and judge all bundled into one,
an IRS examiner can accuse and question the taxpayer, find him in
violation of IRS regulations, and demand back taxes and impose
penalties.
Unlike the IRS, many agencies offer versions of at least some of
the Constitution’s procedural rights. For example, though agencies
do not use juries and real judges, many provide hearings, employ
allegedly independent ALJs, and otherwise adopt procedures that
mimic those of regular courts.17 Yet these agency procedures tend to
be pale imitations that fall far short of the Constitution’s protections.
The loss of one right after another has become so commonplace
that it often goes unnoticed. To someone fined by an agency, it is

26 USC § 7602 authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to take specified actions for
“the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, . . . determining the liability
of any person for any internal revenue tax,” or other such ends. What Americans call
an “audit” is what the Internal Revenue Code calls an “examination” under 26 USC §
7602, which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to “examine any books, papers,
records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry.” This section
also authorizes him more formally to “summon the person liable for tax . . . to appear
before the Secretary . . . and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and
to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.”
Id.
17 Some ALJs are not employed by their agency, but by a separate adjudicatory
agency—notably the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.
16
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obvious enough that he has not had the sort of justice he could expect
from a court. What is less well understood, even by legal academics,
is that administrative adjudication systemically evades the
Constitution’s procedural rights.
II. JURIES
Jury rights illustrate the loss. Although the government must comply
with the Constitution’s jury guarantees when it takes the high road
of proceeding against Americans in court, it can evade juries simply
by taking the low road of acting against Americans through agencies.
A. RIGHT TO A JURY
No right was more insistently protected by the Constitution.
Article III guarantees a jury in the “trial of all crimes,” and the Sixth
Amendment echoes this, stipulating that the accused shall enjoy a
jury in “all criminal prosecutions.” 18 The Seventh Amendment,
moreover, preserves the right of trial by jury in “suits at common
law”—meaning all civil cases outside of equity, admiralty, and
military jurisdiction.19 With these exceptions, juries were guaranteed,
regardless of whether a case was criminal or civil. 20

U.S. Const. art. III; id. amend. VI.
U.S. Const. amend. VII.
20 The only exception was for cases up to $20. This fixed and rather low monetary floor
is often thought to reflect a failure among the founders to understand inflation. In fact,
it echoes the traditional baseline for the right to a jury in civil cases. There simply was
no right to a jury in cases below the jurisdictional floor of the common law courts, and
in England, when the courts sat in civil cases, this baseline had been 40 shillings.
American states enacted a range of dollar equivalents, and although they sometimes
raised the floor on account of inflation, they did not go above $20. In this context, the
Constitution adopted its $20 floor for civil jury rights. For the 40 shillings, see PHILIP
HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 410 (2008).
18
19
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Are the jury clauses, however, so broad as to bar administrative
adjudication? The question is answered already by Article III, which
vests the judicial power in the courts, and thus precludes the
government from exercising judicial power outside the courts. 21 But
what about the jury clauses themselves? Did they merely set
standards for the courts, or did they also bar jury-less adjudication
outside the courts?
Already in Magna Charta, the right to be tried by one’s peers was
understood to be a barrier to binding proceedings outside the courts.
When the English barons in 1215 famously secured from King John
the stipulation, in Article 39 of Magna Carta, that “no free man shall
be . . . imprisoned or disseised . . . except by the lawful judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land,” they were not narrowly alluding
to trial by jury. 22 They nonetheless were enunciating a widely
familiar principle about trial by peers that would soon acquire
substance in juries, and were asserting this principle in opposition to
what nowadays would be called administrative adjudication. 23 John
had tended to act against the barons and their retainers not through
the courts, but rather through administrative decisions; and the
barons therefore sought the king’s assurance about trial by the law of
the land or at least by their peers.24 As put by J.C. Holt—the leading
historian of Magna Carta—Article 39 was aimed primarily against
“arbitrary disseisin at the will of the king,” against “summary
process,” and against “arrest and imprisonment on an administrative

This vesting of judicial power was exclusive, as explained in HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 3, at 396-8.
22 WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CHARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT
CHARTER OF KING JOHN 375 (1914).
23 J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 75 (1992) (explaining that Magna Carta’s “insistence on
judgment by peers . . . was a generally recognized axiom”).
24 Id. at 277, 279 (regarding arbitrary imprisonment and disseisin).
21
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order.”25 King John’s biographer, W.L. Warren, even more bluntly
explains that Article 39 targeted “executive action.” 26 Thus, even
though this early provision was not yet understood to concern juries,
it remains suggestive, for it reveals that, already at the beginnings of
the common law, the guarantee of trial by one’s peers not only set a
standard for the courts but also, at least as significantly, took aim at
adjudication outside the courts.
Almost all governments feel tempted to escape lawful paths of
power and associated procedural rights; it therefore is no surprise
that early Americans took an interest in the right of trial by jury.
When Parliament in 1765 required Americans to pay a stamp duty
on paper used for legal documents, it understood that this might
provoke opposition from juries. It therefore, in its notorious Stamp
Act, authorized enforcement of the duties in admiralty courts, which
employed non-common law and jury-less proceedings.27 Americans
were outraged by this evasion of one of their central constitutional
rights as British subjects. The Continental Congress protested that
“trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British
subject in these colonies.” 28 Thus, “by extending the jurisdiction of
the courts of admiralty beyond its ancient limits,” Parliament was
“subvert[ing] the rights and liberty of the colonists.” 29
A little over a decade later, the states themselves were tempted
to skirt jury trials, this time by turning to administrative proceedings
in front of justices of the peace. In 1778, when the Revolution had
devolved in some New Jersey counties into a sort of civil war, the

Id. at 327.
W.L. WARREN, KING JOHN 234 (1978).
27 An Act for Granting and Applying Certain Stamp Duties . . . 1765, 5 Geo. 3 c. 12.
28 Continental Congress, Resolutions (Oct. 19, 1765), in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY (Henry Steele Commager ed., 1948).
29 Id.
25
26
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legislature tried to discourage trading with the enemy by permitting
any individual to seize goods transported across enemy lines and to
secure title to them in a proceeding before a justice of the peace acting
with only a six-man “jury.” 30 A jury, however, was traditionally
understood to mean a body of twelve qualified persons. Accordingly,
the next year, in Holmes & Ketcham v. Walton, the state’s supreme
court held the statute unconstitutional.31 Although the court focused
on the truncated size of the jury, what matters here is that the right
to a jury applied not only in court but also outside it. This right barred
administrative and other binding proceedings outside the regular
courts.
Similar cases occurred in New Hampshire. In 1785, amid a
financial crisis caused by poor harvests and a shortage of specie, the
New Hampshire legislature attempted to facilitate the collection of
small debts by authorizing justices of the peace to hear claims for
debts up to ten pounds without a jury. 32 Though the statute
permitted defendants to appeal these administrative proceedings to
the Inferior Courts and thereby get full de novo jury trials, these courts
in 1786, in what are known as the Ten Pound Cases, repeatedly held
the statute unconstitutional for violating the right to a jury. 33
Common law courts traditionally had jurisdiction where the
disputed amount was over forty shillings, and it thus came to be
understood that there was a right to a jury in any such case. 34 The

HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note 20, at 409 (quoting and explaining
1778 statute).
31 Holmes & Ketcham v. Walton (N.J. 1780), discussed in HAMBURGER, LAW AND
JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note 20, at 420-22.
32 HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note 20, at 423 (quoting and explaining
1785 statute).
33 Id. at 422-35.
34 Id. at 425, 427-28, 435; see also id. at 410 (for underlying question of 40 shilling
jurisdictional floor).
30
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Inferior Courts therefore explained that the New Hampshire statute
was “manifestly contrary to the constitution of this state.” 35 These
early constitutional decisions confirm that the right to a jury barred
adjudicatory proceedings outside regular courts—at least where the
disputed amount was above the traditional jurisdictional floor of
common law courts.
B. EVASION
Nowadays, the Supreme Court allows the administrative
evasion of jury rights. It recognizes the conflict between
administrative procedure and the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee
of juries in civil cases. 36 But rather than let this amendment bar
administrative adjudication, the Court simply declares that the
government interest in such adjudication always overcomes the right
to a jury.
Equity. One justification for denying jury rights is that much
administrative adjudication could be understood to grant equitable
remedies, thus placing it outside the Seventh Amendment’s
guarantee of a jury in “Suits at common law.” 37 For example, the
Securities Exchange Commission’s ALJs can issue cease-and-desist
orders, industry bans, and disgorgement, and some scholarship
therefore suggests that administrative adjudication can be

Macgregore v. Furber (N.H. Rockingham Cty. Inf. Ct. 1786), quoted in HAMBURGER,
LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note 20, at 427.
36 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442,
450 (1977) (“when Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may assign their
adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be
incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction that jury trial is
to be ‘preserved’ in ‘suits at common law.’”).
37 U.S. Const. amend. VII.
35
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considered equitable. 38 But the agency adjudication of regulatory
claims is not analogous to equity, for agency adjudicators are not
judges.
The whole point of equity is to have a judge exercise equitable
discretion about law and remedies, and from this perspective,
although there cannot be a jury, there has to be a judge. Indeed,
because of the absence of a jury, the role of a judge in equity is even
more important than at law. Equity, in other words, is singularly
dependent on the presence of a judge—meaning not just any
adjudicator, but a real judge, who enjoys and exercises real
independence, and who is learned enough to make decisions about
equity.
Administrative adjudicators, even ALJs, do not meet this
standard. They are not drawn from a pool that includes the highest
ranks of the legal profession; they are not chosen with the scrutiny
that comes with presidential appointment and Senate confirmation;
indeed, they are selected by the very agencies whose cases they
decide.39 However well meaning, they generally lack the intellectual
breadth traditionally expected of judges sitting in equity. 40 And

David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1205 (2016)
(such remedies “look more like equitable remedies than the sorts of damages remedies
that look like common law relief”).
39 Agencies allegedly choose their ALJs only from the top three candidates, but in fact
they can also choose from the vast pool of ALJs at other agencies. For example, at the
SEC, 3 of the agency’s 5 ALJs are apparently drawn from that larger pool. See Amicus
Brief of the New Civil Liberties Alliance at 4-6, Lucia v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n), 2018
WL 1326145 (U.S. 2018) (No. 17–130).
40 On the tendency of ALJs to lack the intellectual breadth necessary for an exercise of
equitable discretion, note Judge Rakoff’s comments about their “narrow, tunnel-vision
view of the law.” Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Rakoff Continues Crusade Against SEC Admin
Courts, LAW360 (Nov. 21, 2014, 1:46 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/598561
/rakoff-continues-crusade-against-sec-admin-courts [https://perma.cc/2QBH-BUBJ]
(reporting on Rakoff’s remarks at a panel at Columbia Law School), quoted by Zaring,
supra note, 38 at 1217.
38
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because they are required to follow agency rules, interpretations, and
other policies, and can be disciplined for doing otherwise, they have
little room to act equitably.41 Indeed, their decisions ultimately are
not even their own, as many ALJs cannot make final decisions but
must leave finalization to agency heads; and even when ALJs can
make final decisions, these are usually reviewable by their agency
heads. Some ALJs (as will be seen) have complained about pressure
from their agency heads and more generally about a lack of
independence.42 Last but not least, there is reason to fear that many
ALJs shift the burdens of proof and persuasion to defendants and
that some are consistently biased in favor of their agencies. 43
None of this is consistent with equity. It gets equity exactly
backwards to conclude that an analogy to equity can justify
administrative adjudication.
Statutory Actions. Another justification for denying jury rights is
that the Seventh Amendment’s phrase “suits at common law” means
common law actions, as opposed to actions authorized by statute.

Another commentator writes that their opinions “ooze parochialism and tunnel
vision, again showing the administrative forum is no place for enforcement actions of
. . . magnitude,” SEC ALJ in Bebo Case Refuses to Consider Constitutional Challenge and
Denies More Time to Prepare Defense, SEC. DIARY (Apr. 8, 2015),
http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/04/08/sec-alj-in-bebo-case-refuses-to-considerconstitutional-challenge-and-denies-more-time-to-prepare-defense [https://perma
.cc/K7NS-EDZK], quoted by Zaring, supra note 38, at 1214.
Adrian Vermeule observes the danger of attributing too much to judges who are
not the intellectual equivalents of Hercules, and his point is especially apt with regard
to ALJs and other administrative “judges.” Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young,
Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730
(2000).
41 See infra pp. 742-47 and accompanying notes.
42 See notes 93-100.
43 See notes 93-100, 102, & 105.
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Such was the theory once put forward in cases such as NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp. and Curtis v. Loether.44
What led to the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, however,
were widespread demands for jury rights generally in civil actions.45
The Amendment therefore carefully guarantees juries in suits at
common law—that is, in all civil cases outside of equity, admiralty,
and the military—not merely in common law actions.46
The Philadelphia Convention had spent much time on the
subject. As William Spaight—one of the North Carolina delegates—
explained, “the trial by jury was not forgotten in the Convention; the
subject took up a considerable time to investigate it.” 47 But the
Convention found it “impossible to make any one uniform
regulation for all of the states, or that would include all cases where
it would be necessary.”48 Anti-Federalists, however, cried out for the
guarantee of juries in civil cases. Just ten days after the Convention
completed the Constitution, Richard Henry Lee prosed a bill of rights
providing that “the trial by Jury in Criminal and Civil cases . . . shall

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 48-49 (1937) (“The instant case is
not a suit at common law or in the nature of such a suit. The proceeding is one
unknown to the common law. It is a statutory proceeding.”); Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 194-95 (1974) (discussing cases that acknowledge the “congressional power
to entrust enforcement of statutory rights to an administrative process or specialized
court of equity free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment.”).
Perhaps the narrowest interpretation of the Seventh Amendment comes from David
Zaring, who argues: “The problem with the jury-trial argument is that it only applies
to ‘Suits at common law,’ and the SEC’s administrative proceedings, designed to
protect investors in kinds of markets that did not exist at the time of the framing of the
Constitution, are not those kinds of suits.” Zaring, supra note 38, at 1205. From this
point of view, the right to a jury is not guaranteed where new markets develop.
45 See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 50 (quoting Hamilton).
46 See HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 3, at 246-47.
47 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 144 (Jonathan Elliot, ed. 1836).
48 Id.
44
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be held sacred.” 49 The demand for a right to a jury in civil cases
rapidly became one of the most prominent arguments against the
Constitution. William Davie informed James Madison that the
people of North Carolina “insist on the trial by jury being expressly
secured to them in all cases.”50 Alexander Hamilton admitted in the
Federalist: “The objection to the plan of the convention, which has met
with most success in this state, and perhaps in several of the other
states, is that relative to the want of a constitutional provision for the trial
by jury in civil cases.”51
To put such concerns to rest, Congress proposed the Seventh
Amendment. Of course, many in Congress and among the people
understood that a right to juries in civil cases would come with some
inconvenience, for this had been thoroughly discussed in 1787 and
1788. Nonetheless, in the Seventh Amendment, Congress recognized
the popular expectation that juries should be guaranteed in both
criminal and civil cases. And outside of equity, admiralty, and the
military, this meant “in all cases.”52
Acknowledging the gist of this history, the Supreme Court has
abandoned its earlier theory that the Seventh Amendment does not
apply to statutory actions. Notably, in Atlas Roofing Company, Inc. v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, it concedes that the
Amendment’s phrase “Suits at common law” had traditionally been
construed to refer to “cases tried prior to the adoption of the Seventh

Proposed Amendments (Sept. 27, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
337 (1976).
50 Letter from William R. Davie to James Madison (June 10, 1789), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS 246 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds. 1991).
51 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 558 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
52 Letter from William R. Davie to James Madison (June 10, 1789), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS 246 (1991). The only exception was for cases of $20 or less.
49

OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
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Amendment in courts of law in which jury trial was customary, as
distinguished from courts of equity or admiralty, in which jury trial
was not.”53
Public Rights. Instead of drawing a line between common law and
statutory actions, the Supreme Court in Atlas held that when the
government administratively asserts “public rights” under a statute,
its public rights triumph over the merely private assertion of the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury.54 Public rights, however, are an
odd foundation for denying the Constitution’s jury rights.
The Court had traditionally used the term “public rights” as a
label for the lawful sphere of executive action. 55 Nonetheless, in a
series of cases, including Atlas Roofing in 1977, the Court unmoored
the phrase from its traditional usage and used it to dispense with the
Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury in agency proceedings against
Americans.56 An ALJ (acting, of course, without a jury) heard charges
against Atlas and fined it $600 for violating safety standards, after
which Atlas appealed to the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission and then to the courts—each time being told that the
ALJ’s findings of fact, as adopted by the commission, displaced

430 U.S. 442, 449 (1977) (citing Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433 (1830)).
In Atlas, the Court explained: “At least in cases in which ‘public rights’ are being
litigated—e.g., cases in which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce
public rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to enact—the Seventh
Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the factfinding function and
initial adjudication to an administrative forum with which the jury would be
incompatible.” 330 U.S. at 450. It added: “In sum, the cases discussed above stand
clearly for the proposition that, when Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’
it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial
would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction that
jury trial is to be ‘preserved’ in ‘suits at common law.’” Id. at 455.
55 HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 3, at 247.
56 Atlas, 430 U.S. at 455.
53
54
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Atlas’s right to a jury.57 As it happens, binding agency adjudication,
including fact finding, is not within the scope of the Constitution’s
grant of executive power; but even if it were, it would not defeat the
Seventh Amendment, for the Constitution’s rights are limits on
government power. 58 In other words, rights trump power.
Understanding this obstacle, the Supreme Court in Atlas Roofing
recast administrative power as a right—indeed, as a “public right”—
which by implication trumped any private claim of right, even if
based on the Constitution.59
This shift in locution—by which a government power of dubious
constitutionality was renamed a “public right,” and by which a
constitutional right was implicitly denigrated as “private”—has
inverted the relationship between government power and the right
to a jury.60 Whereas James Madison considered rights as exceptions
to power, administrative power is now an exception to the right to a
jury. 61 To be sure, government interests can be relevant for
understanding the extent of a constitutional right. 62 Here, however,
a central constitutional right is invariably swept away whenever the
government proceeds outside the courts simply because of the
“public” or governmental character of administrative enforcement.63
The incompatibility of the “public rights” argument with the U.S.
Constitution, and the origins of this argument in a notoriously unfree

Id.
Philip Hamburger, The Inversion of Rights and Power, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 731, 738-52
(2015) (explaining that constitutional rights are “exceptions” to power).
59 Atlas, 430 U.S. at 455.
60 Hamburger, Inversion, supra note 57, at 757-62 (noting how the public rights doctrine
inverts rights and power).
61 Id. at 749.
62 Id. at 765-75.
63 Although Atlas confines this doctrine to government actions authorized by statute,
430 U.S. at 455, this is scarcely a limitation.
57
58
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theory of government, can be left aside here. 64 More central, for
purposes of this Article, is the Supreme Court’s astonishing position.
The Court concedes that administrative adjudication would
ordinarily be barred by the right to a jury. But it allows such
adjudication to escape the constitutional right by elevating
government power as a public right, which defeats the private
assertion of the Constitution’s right. Might trumps right.
III. DUE PROCESS
The fate of due process reveals an even worse evasion of
procedural rights. Unlike juries, which are easily identifiable
institutions employed by courts, the due process of law has seemed
an open-ended principle. The Constitution’s assurances of due
process (in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments) have thus seemed
to serve as catch-all protections for procedural fairness. But
regardless of the exact breadth of this right, it traditionally was not
merely a standard for the courts; more concretely, it was a barrier
against what might happen outside the courts.
A. DUE PROCESS
As with juries, the underlying principle for due process dates
back to Magna Carta and Article 39’s assurance that “no free man
shall be . . . imprisoned or disseized . . . except by the lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”65 Like the guarantee
about judgment by one’s peers, the alternative guarantee about the
law of the land was a response to the king’s tendency to act against
men not through his courts, but through administrative decisions.

See HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 3, at 247-48 note m
(tracing civilian origins of idea of public right).
65 McKechnie, supra note 22, at 375 note d.
64
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The principle that the king should act against Englishmen only
through the law of the land eventually became the more familiar
principle of due process of law—most notably in two statutes during
the reign of King Edward III. These enactments remain significant,
for they confirm that due process, from its formation, barred
administrative adjudication.
Not content to hold his subjects to account in the courts of law,
Edward also summarily called them before his council for
questioning and punishment. In 1354, Parliament therefore enacted:
“No man of what estate or condition that he be, shall be put out of
land or tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor
put to death, without being brought in answer by due process of the
law”—meaning the process of the courts of law.66
King Edward failed to live up to this statute, and within a
decade, he once again was hauling men into his council instead of
working through the courts. Parliament therefore passed another
due process statute in 1368.67 After reciting that the attempts to hold
subjects accountable “before the king’s council” were “against the
law,” this statute provided that “no man be put to answer without
presentment before justices, or matter of record, or by due process
and writ original, according to the ancient law of the land.” 68 As
summarized on the margin of the Parliament roll, “None shall be put
to answer without due process of law.” 69 Thus, any move—even
merely with a summons—to compel subjects to answer questions or
charges in the king’s administrative proceedings was unlawful. This

28 Edw. 3 c. 3.
42 Edw. 3 c. 3.
68 Id.
69 Id. That this was not the original title of the statute, but was added in the margins,
becomes clear from the image in The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, 1275-1504,
on CD-Rom: Rotuli Parliamentorum (Scholarly Digital Editions).
66
67
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due process statute barred any royal attempt at binding
administrative adjudication.
Incidentally, one of the most curious aspects of the 1368 Due
Process Statute was its final clause, which instructed the courts that
“if anything henceforth be done to the contrary, it shall be void in
law, and held for error.” 70 This has long puzzled commentators.
Some have fancifully suggested that Parliament was inventing
“judicial review,” but the notion that an unlawful act was void had
long been familiar, and there was no need for Parliament to invent it.
Why, then, the final clause? In all probability, the judges in some
cases had deferred to the king about the lawfulness of his conduct or
had hesitated to hold the king’s actions void—both of which have
equivalents in contemporary judicial review of administrative
actions.71 Parliament therefore instructed the judges to hold that any
royal acts contrary to the 1368 due process statute were void.
The practical implications were immediate. In 1368, after a
commission established by King Edward seized and imprisoned a
man and took his goods, the judges held the commission void, saying
that it was “against the law” because it authorized the commissioners
“to take a man and his goods without indictment, suit of a party, or
due process.”72 Adjudication outside the courts was contrary to due
process, and the judges held it unlawful.
For Americans, the role of due process as a barrier to
adjudication outside the courts remained familiar because of its role
in the constitutional controversies of the seventeenth century. Due
process was a foundation of the 1628 Petition of Right (a predecessor
of the U.S. Bill of Rights) and of the 1641 statute abolishing the Star

42 Edw. 3 c. 3.
Cf. the tendency of courts, even when they hold agency actions unlawful, to remand
to the agency rather than simply hold the actions void.
72 Commission, 42 Ass. pl. 5 (1368).
70
71
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Chamber (one of the enactments that, at least for a while, largely
ended “prerogative” or centralized administrative adjudication in
England). 73 Studying this history, Americans learned that the
evasion of the courts was a recurring danger. They also learned that
due process guarantees were not just standards for the courts, but
more prominently were barriers to adjudication outside courts. And
this matters for the U.S. Constitution. When the Fifth Amendment
guaranteed the due process of law, it continued in the tradition of
Magna Carta, the due process statutes, the Petition of Right, and the
statute abolishing the Star Chamber.
The Fifth Amendment’s words reveal its breadth: “No person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.” 74 If the amendment had aimed merely to limit what the
courts could do, it would have stated (in the active voice): “No court
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” But, like the other procedural clauses in the Bill of
Rights, the Fifth Amendment had to do more than confine the courts;
it also had to bar adjudication outside the courts. Such adjudication
was an old, recurring threat, and guarantees of due process and other
procedural rights would have been meaningless if the government
could have avoided them by simply sidestepping the courts.
Therefore, like so many procedural rights, the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause is written in the passive voice and it thereby
limits all parts of government.75
Also revealing is the location of the Fifth Amendment. To bar
adjudication outside the courts, the Fifth Amendment and the other

Petition of Right, 3 Car. c. 1 (1628); An Act for the Regulating of the Privy Council
and for Taking Away the Court Commonly called the Star Chamber, 16 Car. c. 10
(1641) (both reciting 1368 due process statute).
74 U.S. Const. amend. V.
75 Id.
73
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procedural rights could not simply modify Article III of the
Constitution, for they then would have limited only the courts.
Instead, they also had to limit the executive, established in Article
II. 76 They additionally had to confine the Congress, established in
Article I, lest that body authorize adjudication outside the courts. 77
The drafters of the Bill of Rights therefore changed how they
wrote it. They originally framed amendments that would have
rewritten particular articles in the body of the Constitution—altering
their wording article by article, section by section. 78 Ultimately, the
drafters decided, instead, to add their amendments at the end of the
whole Constitution. 79 This proved crucial, for it enabled the
procedural amendments to limit all parts of government. These two
drafting techniques—using the passive voice and putting
amendments at the end—give the procedural rights their breadth.
The implication for due process was recognized by one of the
earliest academic commentaries on the U.S. Bill of Rights. St. George
Tucker was a Virginia judge who taught constitutional law at
William and Mary in the 1790s. Among his bound notes are loose
pages, apparently from 1796, in which he quotes the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and then concludes: “Due process
of law must then be had before a judicial court, or a judicial
magistrate”—a point he also stated in the main body of his lectures.80

U.S. Const. art. II, III.
U.S. Const. art. I.
78 House Committee Report (July 28, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 29-33 (Helen E. Veit
et al. eds. 1991).
79 House Resolution and Articles of Amendment (Aug. 24, 1789), reprinted in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS
37-41 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds. 1991).
80 St. George Tucker, Law Lectures, p. 4 of four loose pages inserted in notebook 2,
Tucker-Coleman Papers, Mss. 39.1 T79, Box 62, Special Collections Research Center,
Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary, https://digital
76
77
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As later put by Chancellor James Kent, the due process of law “means
law, in its regular course of administration, through courts of law.”81
This was particularly clear because of the core meaning of due
process. Although the due process of law has increasingly been
understood to govern all of a court’s proceedings, it most centrally
was a matter of legal process: the original process by which
individuals were brought into court, the mesne process employed by
courts during litigation, and the final process by which judgment was
executed.82 On this basis, it was inescapable that the due process of
law could be had only from a court.
The Fifth Amendment thus generally bars the government from
imposing any legally obligatory adjudication on Americans outside
the courts and their processes. This was the breadth of the principle

archive.wm.edu/handle/10288/13361. When, in the main body of his lecture notes,
he discussed the courts, he commented: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, (and these we shall remember are the objects of all rights) without due
process of law; which it is the province of the judiciary to grant.” Id. at 5: 203-04.
81 JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 13. See also JOSEPH STORY, 3
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §1783 (“this clause in effect affirms the right of
trial according to the process and proceedings of the common law”).
82 Commenting on the fourteenth-century due process statutes, Keith Jurow explains:
“the word ‘process’ itself meant writs. To be more precise, it referred to those writs
which summoned parties to appear in as well as those by which execution of
judgments was carried out.” Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the
Origins of Due Process, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265, 272-73 (1975). When he gets to the
eighteenth century, Jurrow writes: “Blackstone made no separate reference to due
process of law in his commentaries, he did have a chapter on process which, like earlier
treatises, divided it into original process, mesne process, and final process.” Id. at 278.
Against the background of such understandings of “process,” it makes sense that
the 1368 Due Process Statute recited that “no man be put to answer without
presentment before justices, or matter of record, or by due process and writ original,
according to the ancient law of the land.” It also thus makes sense that the early
summary and eventual title of the statute was: “None shall be put to answer without
due process of law.” See supra text accompanying notes 65-71.
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from its very beginnings; this was how the Fifth Amendment was
drafted; and this was how it was understood in the 1790s.
B. EVASION
Nowadays, the Supreme Court assumes that most adjudication
outside the courts does not violate due process.83 When it does apply
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to administrative
adjudications, it is not to bar such proceedings, but to explain that
they require much less process than the due process of law in the
courts—usually little more than an administrative hearing. 84
Even an administrative hearing is no longer predictably
required. As the Supreme Court explained in 1976 in Mathews v.
Eldridge—a disability-payments termination case—a hearing is
guaranteed only when needed to prevent an erroneous government
deprivation of a private interest and when not outweighed by the
government’s interests, including any fiscal and administrative
burdens. 85 Outside such circumstances, “the ordinary principle” is
that “something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to
adverse administrative action.” 86 Due process thus usually gets
reduced to even less than the triviality of an administrative hearing.
The triviality of such a hearing becomes clear when one realizes
that the Court understands a “hearing” to include a determination

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). (holding that due process requires the
government to offer a hearing before denying some types of welfare benefits). Echoing
the Supreme Court, Peter Strauss, for example, writes about due process: “As
originally understood, this instruction chiefly concerned the ordinary processes of
courts. . . . There was no reason to think that it applied to procedures followed within
the government bureaucracy.” PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES 13 (2002).
84 Id.
85 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
86 Id. at 343.
83
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without an oral presentation. 87 Thus, even where due process
requires an “evidentiary hearing,” this does not mean that affected
persons will actually be heard.88
Just how much the government can thereby avoid anything
remotely like a court’s due process of law can be illustrated by the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act—more familiarly known as CERCLA. Under this
statute, the Environmental Protection Agency adjudicates by issuing
“unilateral administrative orders.”89 As landowners, large and small,
have learned to their surprise, the EPA can simply order individuals
or businesses (even those without negligence or other fault) to clean
up their land. The EPA thereby adjudicates and commands private
action without so much as a hearing.
The underlying point of the Supreme Court’s due process
doctrine, as the judges noted in Morrissey v. Brewer, is that “due
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.” 90 From this flexible and contextual
perspective, administrative process (always without a jury, and often
without even a hearing) is “all the process that is due.” 91
Of course, less open-ended procedural rights, such a jury or the
privilege against self-incrimination, cannot by themselves be
understood so flexibly. Nonetheless, the evasion of the full range of
procedural rights often gets summed up as a problem of due process,
and the relatively concrete rights thereby get dismissed on the theory
that due process is flexible, according to its context. Procedural rights

Id. at 344-45.
Id. (distinguishing an “evidentiary hearing” from an “oral presentation to the
decisionmaker”).
89 42 U.S.C. §9606(b) (2016).
90 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
91 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985).
87
88
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thus become elastic barriers that the government can adjust at its
convenience.
If administrative tribunals offered extra procedural guarantees
that were especially reassuring, it might seem reasonable to accept
some diminished due process. But the Constitution does not allow
such rebalancing of gains and losses. In any case, there clearly are
massive losses in procedural protections and only dubious marginal
gains.92
Indeed, the dilution of due process creates incentives for
violations of the Constitution. The government’s circumvention of
the courts is rewarded with the opportunity to avoid procedural
rights, and the government’s escape from procedural rights is
rewarded with the assurance that this is all the process that is due.
The evasion of the courts and their processes, which once
tempted kings, has thus returned on a greater scale than ever before.
Though the due process of law developed as a constitutional right
against administrative adjudication, it now is rephrased as “the
process that is due” in order to excuse such adjudication. Far from
preventing the evasion, due process now legitimizes it.

The clearest plausible gains are the relatively high speed and low cost of
administrative hearings, compared to court cases. But these are not additional
procedural protections; rather they are side effects of the systemic loss of such
protections. And for defendants that need their procedural rights to defend
themselves, the side effects of losing these rights are not advantageous. That
administrative adjudication is not a good procedural bargain for many defendants
becomes clear from the fact that the government does not offer it as a choice, in the
manner of alternative dispute resolution, but instead forcibly imposes it. The
government evidently recognizes that a significant number of parties do not think that
the putative gains outweigh the losses.
92

946

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 11:915

IV. FAIRNESS
One might justify administrative adjudication by saying that it is
After all, it is frequently overseen by ALJs, most of whom are
very conscientious. In this spirit, commentators tend to assume that
administrative adjudicators exercise independent judgment and that
their process is even handed. But neither assumption is sustainable.
Far from being fair, administrative adjudication violates basic
principles of due process.
fair.93

A. INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT
Do administrative adjudicators really have independent
judgment? Many of them are not ALJs and thus lack any protection
for their independence. Accordingly, any claim for the independence
of administrative adjudicators comes down to the decisions of ALJs,
and this is sobering because even they are not really independent.
In a 1992 survey of ALJs, 15 percent complained of threats to their
independence, with 8 percent saying that this was a frequent
problem.94 Giving texture to such statistics, the Wall Street Journal in

Along similar lines, David Zaring defends the SEC’s ALJs on the basis of Mathews v.
Elridge’s due process test, the alleged similarities between ALJ and district court
proceedings, and the “statutorily protected independence” of ALJs. Zaring, supra note
38, at 1198, 1200. But such arguments are strained. Mathews offers only a weak
standard developed in a benefits case (as explained infra pp. 749-50); ALJ proceedings
are very different from district court proceedings (for example, in not offering equal
discovery, in not predictably offering the usual burdens of proof and persuasion, and
in not having juries); and the statutory independence of ALJs does not extend to the
key questions about the lawfulness of administrative rules—questions that come up
in all ALJ cases (as explained infra pp. 742-47 ).
94 For the 1992 survey, see Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today,
46 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 278 (1994). The numbers were more than twice as high for
administrative law judges in the Social Security Administration, but as they decide
benefits, the argument here rests on the figures from administrative law judges outside
that agency.
93
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2015 published the complaint of Lillian McEwen—a former ALJ at
the Securities Exchange Commission—that she had been pressured
to reach decisions favoring the Commission. 95 The Journal also
revealed that one of the Commission’s ALJs “ha[d] found the
defendants liable in every contested case he ha[d] heard”—an
astonishing record of fealty to his agency. 96 As summarized by New
York Times reporter Gretchen Morgenson, the “mind-set” of the SEC
ALJs “reflects the agenda of the agency, which in this arena is
enforcement.”97 There are thus some initial reasons to be concerned
about the independence of ALJs.
The seriousness of the problem with ALJs becomes apparent
from the institutional limits on their independence. It is often said
that ALJs are protected in their tenure and salary by the Federal Merit
Systems Protection Board.98 But ALJs can be removed, suspended, or

Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins With In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803.
96 Jean Eaglesham, Fairness of SEC Judges Is in Spotlight, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fairness-of-sec-judges-is-in-spotlight-1448236970
(reporting about ALJ Cameron Elliot).
97 Gretchen Morgenson, At the S.E.C., a Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/at-the-sec-a-question-ofhomecourt-edge.html [https://perma.cc/43Q3-RP4Z] (quoting securities law
practitioner Lewis D. Lowenfels).
98 As I have written before: “The sanctions on administrative law judges are imposed
by the federal Merit Systems Protection Board, thus conveniently allowing agencies to
say that they cannot punish their administrative law judges for nonconformity.”
HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 3, at 572, n.9. For
example, the Environmental Protection Agency declares:
[N]or can the Agency decrease an ALJ’s salary or otherwise negatively
[a]ffect the other terms and conditions of their employment. Further, all
ALJs are appointed essentially “for life,” in that there is no mandatory
retirement age for ALJs and ALJs can only be removed from their positions
for “good cause” established and determined by the Federal Merit Systems
Protection Board on the record after a hearing, and thus cannot be removed
arbitrarily or for political reasons.
95
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have their salary docked for “good cause,” including their failure to
follow their agency’s policies.99 And when an agency is dissatisfied
with an ALJ, it can simply remove him through a “reduction-in-force
action”—as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission did with
one in 2012.100

EPA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, PRACTICE MANUAL 3 (July 2011). But this
appearance of independence is belied by the reality.
99 After an opportunity for hearing before the Merit Systems Protection Board, an
agency can remove, suspend, demote, or reduce the pay of its ALJs for “good cause.”
5 U.S.C. § 7521. And neither this statute nor regulations have defined “good cause.”
Nor have the courts defined “good cause”— except by specifying a few things that
it is not. Long v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 526, 534 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Although a charge of good cause cannot be “base[d] . . . on reasons
which constitute an improper interference with the ALJ’s performance of his quasijudicial functions,” Brennan v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 787 F.2d 1559, 1563
(Fed. Cir. 1986), this nonetheless leaves room to remove and otherwise penalize ALJs
for conduct “inconsistent with maintaining confidence in the administrative
adjudicatory process.” Long, 635 F.3d at 536.
It is therefore widely assumed, not least by the Merit Systems Protection Board, that
ALJs are subject to removal and other punishment for failing to follow agency policies,
including agency rules and interpretations. See, e.g., Social Sec. Admin., Office of
Hearing and Appeals v. Anyel, 58 M.S.P.R. 261, 268-69 (M.S.P.B. June 25, 1993), opinion
after remand 66 M.S.P.R. 328 (finding “good cause” in an ALJ’s “adjudicatory errors”
and her “’[i]ndependence’ consisting of freedom to ignore binding agency
interpretations of law”).
100 5 U.S.C. § 7521(b); Letter from Susan A. Poling, Gen. Counsel, Gov’t Accountability
Office, to Rep. Robert Aderholt & Rep. Jack Kingston (Jan. 23, 2013) (available at
https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651588.pdf) (last visited on February 28, 2018); see
Amicus Brief of the New Civil Liberties Alliance at 15, Lucia v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n),
2018 WL 1326145 (U.S. 2018) (No. 17–130) (regarding “the ALJ purge that occurred at
the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission”).
Incidentally, there are also national security limits on the independence of ALJs. The
head of an agency may suspend any of its ALJs without pay when the agency head
“considers that action necessary in the interests of national security.” And he can then
remove such an ALJ if, “after such investigation and review as he considers necessary,
he determines that removal is necessary or advisable in the interests of national
security. The determination of the head of the agency is final.” 5 U.S.C. § 7532 (2016).
ALJs thus must be cautious about disagreeing with their agency about what is
necessary for national security.
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Even if ALJs could not be removed for good cause and
reductions in force, their independence would remain illusory
because are profoundly constrained in their judgments. According to
the Supreme Court, agencies (and thus their ALJs) cannot judicially
overrule the rules that the agencies have adopted in their quasilegislative capacity. 101 And some agencies bar their ALJs from
questioning the lawfulness of the agencies’ authorizing statutes—as
when the SEC declares that the agency and thus its ALJs have “no
power to invalidate the very statutes that Congress has directed [it]
to enforce.” 102 Indeed, courts have repeatedly said that ALJs are
“subordinate” or “subject” to their agency heads in matters of law,
interpretation, and policy. 103 It is therefore difficult to find cases in
which ALJs have held their agency’s organic statutes, rules, or
interpretations void for being unconstitutional or otherwise
unlawful.104

Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, 284 U.S. 370 (1932).
Milton J. Wallace, Exchange Act Release No. 11252, 1975 SEC LEXIS 2238, at *7 (Feb.
14, 1975), at https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljorders/2015/ap-2675.pdf.
103 See, e.g., Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812
(1989) (regarding “policy and interpretation of law”); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535,
540-41 n.5 (6th Cir. 1986) (regarding “law and policy”); Ass'n of Administrative Law
Judges v. Heckler, 594 F.Supp. 1132, 1141 (D.D.C. 1984) (regarding “law and policy).
104 In one recent SEC case, for example, the ALJ almost summarily rejected the
defendant’s constitutional claims and said of one of them—regarding the ALJ’s
appointment—that it was “more properly addressed to the Commission.” In the Matter
of Gregory T. Bolan, Jr. & Joseph C. Ruggieri, 3 (Sept. 14, 2015), at https://www.
sec.gov/alj/aljdec/2015/id877jsp.pdf. In another SEC case, the ALJ rejected the
defendant’s constitutional claims at slightly greater length, and explained, as to the
appointment question, that “the Commission has repeatedly held that it lacks the
authority “to invalidate the very statutes that Congress has directed [it] to enforce.” In
the Matter of Charles Hill, Jr., Order Denying Respondent’s Motion for Summary
Disposition on Constitutional Issues, 2, quoting Milton J. Wallace, Exchange Act Release
No. 11252, 1975 SEC LEXIS 2238, at *7 (Feb. 14, 1975), at https://www.sec.gov/
alj/aljorders/2015/ap-2675.pdf.
101
102
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The various barriers to ALJ decisions about the unlawfulness of
agency rules and authorizing statutes are especially disturbing
because of the number of cases in which such rules and statutes are
of dubious legality. Not merely in a few cases, but in all
administrative proceedings, there are inescapable questions of
unlawfulness—sometimes, for example, under the Administrative
Procedure Act, and always under the Constitution. 105 ALJs are thus
deprived of their independence on the most persistent and serious
legal issues.
The layers of interference with ALJs mean that, whenever the
government is a party to administrative proceedings, the ALJs are
systematically biased in favor of the legal position of one of the
parties—the most powerful of parties—in violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s due process of law. Even if, at a personal level, ALJs
are always conscientiously independent, the institutional restrictions
on their decisionmaking deprives them of independence and renders
them biased on central legal issues.
Making matters worse, the decisions of ALJs are often subject to
review or finalization by agency heads. The latter are political
appointees who do not hear the witnesses or arguments in the cases,
who do not need to read the record, and who often made the decision
to prosecute or who at least adopted the underlying prosecutorial
policies. In other words, these agency leaders—the ultimate
decisionmakers in their agencies—usually lack even the pretense of
independence. Many defendants therefore do not bother to appeal

It is worth emphasizing that this Article understands administrative adjudications
to include only adjudications that bind, in the sense of imposing legal obligation, in
contrast to lawful executive determinations, such as those about the distribution of
benefits. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
105
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from their ALJs. 106 And there is reason to fear that the ALJs
themselves try to avoid disagreeing with their agency heads.107
Thus, even in agencies with ALJs, the independence of
administrative adjudicators does not bear close examination. Rather
than display fairness, the adjudicators repeatedly and grossly violate
the due process of law.
B. SKEWED PROCESS
Not only the “judges” but also their process is skewed. A quick
summary of agency process reveals how far it is from the
Constitution’s due process.
Agencies rely on subpoenas for discovery, usually without
allowing the same discovery for defendants. The agencies can also
introduce hearsay, preclude counterclaims, and bar motions to
dismiss. And even when agency proceedings are criminal in nature,

According to a BNA report in 2016, “Respondents appealed only 11 out of the 36
initial decisions—or 30.5 percent—in 2013,” and that figure “dropped to 15 out of 63 or
23.8 percent in 2014, and 13 out of 60 or 21.6 percent last year.” Among the reasons
given for the declining appeals was that “the appeals process is “very slow,” that the
SEC “can actually increase the sanctions imposed by ALJs,” and that “the agency's
current configuration, with Chairman Mary Jo White and Commissioner Kara Stein,
who are perceived as very pro-enforcement and if anything, tougher than the
enforcement division, may also contribute to the dwindling number of appeals.”
Cameron Finch, Appeals of SEC ALJ Decisions Are Low and Declining, BNA (July 22, 2016)
(internal quotations marks omitted), https://www.bna.com/appeals-sec-alj-n730
14445155/.
107 At the SEC, for example, there have been concerns that ALJs anticipate the
predispositions of the commissioners. Eaglesham records what happened when
defendants asked an SEC ALJ to reject the charges against them without a hearing:
“Clad in a black robe, Judge Brenda Murray explained to the brokers that the
commissioners who run the SEC and approve all the civil charges filed by the agency
don’t want its judges second-guessing them. ‘So for me to say I am wiping it out,’ Ms.
Murray said at the hearing last year, ‘it looks like I am saying to these presidential
appointee commissioners, I am reversing you. And they don’t like that.’” Jean
Eaglesham, Fairness, supra note 95.
106
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juries are absent. An agency can take as long as it wants to prepare
its cases, but it can force respondents to defend themselves at
hearings for which they have little time to prepare. The SEC, for
example, recently gave a company about four months to prepare its
defense, though the investigative file was 22 million pages long—
“larger than the entire printed Library of Congress.”108
Moreover, the applicable burdens of proof and persuasion,
whether civil or criminal, are often reversed. Unlike a district court
judge, an ALJ can take “official notice” of a material fact even when
it does not appear in the record, even when it is not adjudicative,
even when it is not within the agency’s expertise, even when it is
within reasonable dispute, and even without a hearing. 109 And
whenever an ALJ takes “official notice” of a fact, the defendant ends
up having to undertake the burdens of proof and persuasion. The
reversal of burdens is especially far reaching when it results from an
understated agency assumption—such as the expectation, alleged by
McEwen at the SEC, that “the burden was on the people who were
accused to show that they didn’t do what the agency said they
did.” 110 Thus, even where agency actions are criminal in nature,
defendants often have to prove their innocence.
In sum, neither the personnel nor the process justifies the
conclusion that administrative adjudication is fair. And even if it
were, it is a pale imitation of the due process of law. It is like being
served water instead of whisky.

Adam Klasfeld, ‘Big Short’ Villain’s Due-Process Is Just Dandy, COURTROOM NEWS
SERVICE (Dec. 11, 2014), https://courthousenews.com/big-short-villains-due-processis-just-dandy/. The casefile apparently was shared with the defendants in December
2013. Id. The first day of hearings was March 31, 2014. Harding Advisory LLC and Wing
F. Chau, Release No. 734, File No. 3-15574, 1 (Initial Decision Jan. 12, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljdec/2015/id734ce.pdf.
109 Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); 5 U.S.C. § 556(e).
110 Eaglesham, SEC Wins, supra note 94.
108
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V. MERE DELAY
Of course, even if one does not get one’s procedural rights
initially, in an administrative hearing, one sometimes can get them
later by appealing to the courts. But delayed procedural rights are
not enough.
Juries, due process, and other procedural rights are
constitutional rights already in the first instance, not merely in later
proceedings. Although, in the Ten Pound Cases, the statute
authorizing the administrative proceedings allowed losing
defendants to appeal to the courts and thereby get a trial de novo, with
a jury, the courts nonetheless held the statute unlawful.111 A delayed
jury trial did not cure the denial of a jury in the earlier administrative
hearings. From this perspective, administrative adjudication already
violates procedural rights, regardless of any review in court.
Imagine that federal district courts denied juries, due process,
and other constitutionally guaranteed procedural rights on the
theory that defendants could get such rights later on appeal. This
would be farcical. This delay of procedural rights clearly would be
unconstitutional and profoundly dangerous. And the same is true
when administrative tribunals are said to be merely delaying such
rights.
The delayed access to procedural rights is especially harmful
because of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies—

In Macgregore v. Furber, for example, the plaintiff’s attorney argued that the state’s
constitution did not “say that in causes triable of more than forty shillings value, that
the party shall have a right to trial by jury in the first instance,” and “nor does the law
restrain the party aggrieved from appealing to the Inferior Court where he may have
the same cause tried by a jury in as full and ample a manner as if it had originated at
an Inferior Court.” The justice of the peace upheld such arguments, but on appeal to
the Inferior Court, the statute was held “manifestly contrary to the constitution of this
state.” Macgregore v. Furber (N.H. Rockingham Cty. Inf. Ct. 1786), quoted in
HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, supra note 20, at 427.
111
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requiring persons suffering administrative injuries to pursue all their
administrative remedies before they seek relief in the courts. Taking
advantage of this doctrine, an agency will often exhaust a
defendant’s finances in administrative proceedings, after which he
cannot afford to appeal effectively to the courts. The exhaustion of
administrative remedies thus often operates as the exhaustion of
administrative defendants.
Even if delay and exhaustion were constitutional, the “mere
delay” excuse fails because the evasion of procedural rights does not
end with the administrative adjudication. Rather, it continues on
appeal in the courts. This evasion of procedural rights in court will
be examined in Part VIII. In the meantime, it is enough to observe
that rights delayed are rights denied, particularly when
administrative defendants are exhausted.
VI. EXPANDED RIGHTS
On behalf of the evasion of procedural rights, it may be said that
such rights have been expanded, and this is partly true. For example,
ever since Goldberg v. Kelly in 1970 and Mathews v. Eldridge in 1976,
there has been a due process right to a hearing before the government
cuts off some types of welfare benefits, and this has expanded the
availability of some administrative process. 112 This conventional
narrative, however, is only part of the story.
Goldberg and Mathews offer only a smidgeon of process for
denials of some benefits, and are part of a broader jurisprudence that
accepts a profound denial of due process when the government
imposes administrative constraints. There once was a constitutional
right to the full due process of law in the courts of law for binding
adjudications—for adjudications that impose legal obligation—

112

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
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whether in cutting off life or restricting liberty or property. This
essential right, however, has been reduced to a mere administrative
“hearing” (often where one cannot be heard) and more typically
“something less.”113
The consequences can be seen in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 114 After a
U.S. citizen was captured as an enemy combatant, the United States
simply detained him. Rather than protect Hamdi’s due process right
to a trial in court with a jury and the full due process of a criminal
prosecution, the Court relied on Mathews to conclude that the
government owed Hamdi nothing more than an administrative
decision about his status by neutral adjudicator. 115
The sort of doctrine evident in Goldberg and Mathews therefore
strains at a gnat and swallows the proverbial camel. It secures
negligible administrative process in some benefit cases while
accepting profound denials of due process in constraint cases. The
overall effect is to expand due process very marginally and to
eviscerate the right at its core.116
VII. IMPRACTICABILITY
Is it impracticable to abandon administrative adjudication? A
serious defense of such proceedings is that the courts could not
handle the vast amount of adjudication currently handled by
agencies.
Apologists for administrative power protest that there are over
10,000 administrative adjudicators, whose work obviously could not

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976).
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
115 Id. at 529-31, 533-34.
116 For more on the implications of Goldberg for the distinction between benefits and
constraints, see HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 3, at 3
n.b.
113
114
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be handled by the courts.117 But the vast bulk of such adjudication
does not impose legal obligation and thus (as explained in Part I) is
not what this Article considers administrative power. Instead, most
such adjudication is merely the ordinary and lawful exercise of
executive power—for example, in determining the distribution of
benefits or the status of immigrants. 118
Accordingly, to understand whether courts could really take the
place of administrative adjudicators, one must look specifically at
those agency adjudications in which adjudicators impose legal
obligation. For example, the SEC employs only 5 administrative law
judges, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission has
12, and the National Labor Relations Board has 30.119 In total, outside
the Social Security Administration, there are only 257 ALJs.120 This
number is not overwhelming, and it suggests that the scale of

Paul Verkuil, Response to Philip Hamburger: A “Dicey” Proposal, in Hamburger v.
Verkuil, REALCLEAR POLICY (Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.realclearpolicy.com/
articles/2016/10/25/hamburger_v_verkuil_1753.html (“There are 660 district and
179 circuit judges presently, and somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000 administrative
adjudicators. How many new judges would be necessary under the Hamburger
regime? And who would want those jobs?”)
118 The case load of ALJs has increasingly shifted from regulation to benefits. Daniel J.
Gifford, Federal Administrative Law Judges: The Relevance of Past Choices to Future
Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 59-60 (1997).
119 New Administrative Law Judges at the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), THE
NAT’L LAW REV. (July 10, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/newadministrative-law-judges-securities-exchange-commission-sec
(5
ALJs),
Administrative Law Judges, OSHRC, https://www.oshrc.gov/about/administrativelaw-judges/ (last accessed Mar. 29, 2018) (12 ALJs); Division of Judges Directory, NLRB,
https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/division-judges/division-judges-directory (last
accessed Mar. 29, 2018) (30 ALJs). For the Association of Administrative Law Judge’s
list of U.S. federal agencies utilizing ALJs or Administrative Judges, see
https://web.archive.org/web/20171029005220/https://www.aalj.org/agenciesemploying-administrative-law-judges (archived snapshot of AALJ’s website, which
has since removed the list).
120 William Funk, Slip Slidin’ Away—The Erosion of APA Adjudication, 122 PENN ST. L.
REV. 141, 142 (2017).
117

2018]

ADMINISTRATIVE EVASION

957

administrative adjudication is grossly overstated. At least the
binding adjudications conducted by ALJs could be handled with
only a moderate expansion of the judiciary.121
Another concern about the practicability of doing without
administrative adjudication focuses on juries. Trial by jury is
expensive, and increasingly uncommon because parties settle. It may
therefore seem unrealistic, even romantic, to defend jury rights.
The argument here, however, is not for more jury trials, but
rather against the evasion of jury rights. Even if the government were
prevented from administratively evading jury rights, most
defendants would still want to settle. At least, however, they would
be able do so on the foundation of their right to a jury and thus from
a position of strength.
Even if the number of jury trials were initially to increase, the
preservation of the right to a jury has systemic benefits that outweigh
the costs. When England abandoned juries in most civil actions,
judges in such cases no longer had to instruct juries, and they
therefore tended to make the law more complex and to blur the
distinction between law and fact.122 This is a reminder of one of the
structural roles of juries. When judges must instruct juries about an
area of law, the judges are more likely to distinguish the law and the
facts and are less likely to render doctrine incomprehensible for
laypersons. The existence of juries thus shapes the law in ways that
enable the public to settle disputes and otherwise avoid unnecessary
litigation. Accordingly, it cannot be assumed that the administrative

Although the small number of non-social-security ALJs would seem to be
dispositive, one must also take into account the administrative judges who issue
binding decisions, and this is more difficult to calculate. For many, even if not all such
adjudicators, see Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Law Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1643, 1652, 1709-18 (2016). Such administrative judges include, for example, some
administrators who reach licensing decisions and those who impose civil penalties
under the Clean Water Act.
122 J.H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 81-82 (1979).
121
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evasion of juries really reduces judicial caseloads. On the contrary,
the protection of jury rights is probably beneficial over the long term
not merely for the people but even for the judges.
Overall, there is reason for skepticism about the claims that an
abandonment of administrative adjudication would be
impracticable. At the very least, it is practicable to abolish the ALJs
who engage in binding adjudication.
VIII. EVASION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS IN THE COURTS
It may be thought that judicial review is a cure—that even if (as
seen in Part V) delayed procedural rights are problematic, one can at
least be confident of eventually getting such rights in court. But in
fact, the evasion of procedural rights persists in the courts. The result
is a dual administrative evasion of procedural rights, initially in
administrative tribunals and then in the courts themselves.
When a defendant appeals an administrative decision to the
courts, the judges review and largely defer to the government’s
administrative record. Thus, even in court, defendants do not get the
decision of a jury or even the independent judgment of a judge on
the facts. And where the government is a party, the judges’ deference
to the administrative record systematically favors one party’s version
of the facts. This is an institutionalized judicial bias that brazenly
violates the Fifth Amendment’s due process of law. 123
Similarly, on the law, the judges defer to the government. Most
notably, they defer in varying degrees (under the Chevron, Auer, and
Mead-Skidmore doctrines) to the government’s interpretations of
statutes and of agency rules.124 In other words, not only on the facts

Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1203 (2015).
Id. at 1211 (regarding bias in Chevron deference); id. at 1202 (regarding bias in Auer
deference and Mead-Skidmore deference).
123
124
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but also on the law, defendants do not get the independent judgment
of a judge. And where the government is a party to a case, the judicial
deference amounts to an institutional predisposition or systematic
bias in favor of the legal position of one of the parties. 125
There is judicial bias, in other words, on both the facts and the
law. What, then, is left for the unbiased judgment required by the
due process of law?
The denial of due process continues after judges hold an agency
action unlawful, for they then often hesitate to declare it void—
instead remanding it to the agency.126 And when a district or circuit
court interprets a vague statute administered by an agency, the
Supreme Court, under the Brand X doctrine, allows the agency in
subsequent matters to disregard the judicial precedent and requires
the district or circuit court to follow the agency’s later interpretation
(in accord with Chevron). The judges thereby deny Americans the
benefit of securing precedent through litigation.127
All this is especially disturbing because one would ordinarily
expect the administrative evasion of courts and of procedural rights
to be met with heightened judicial scrutiny. Instead, end-runs

Id. at 1202, 1211. Incidentally, the judges do not need any such deference, for (as
explained elsewhere) after they apply their usual tools of interpretation, if they can
find no further meaning in a statute, they should simply declare that the ambiguous
provision has no discernible meaning—thereby leaving the ambiguity to be cured by
Congress. See id. at 1241-42.
126 For an early and salient example, see U.S. v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 196 (1939)
(holding the district court order invalid but not void on the theory that the court had
been acting in equity). See also William M. Martin, The Morgan Case as a Threat to the
Full Hearing Requirement in Rate Making Proceedings, 3 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93, 95-96
(1941) (noting this discrepancy).
127 Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). For
confirmation of how judges, even after holding an administrative act unlawful,
nonetheless tend to deny due process, see Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of
Administrative Law: Governmental Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power 131
HARV. L. REV. 685 (2018) (arguing that judges hesitate to apply contempt sanctions
against agencies and heads of agencies).
125

960

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 11:915

around procedural rights are rewarded with deference and other
judicial accommodation of agencies.
In short, later court proceedings, rather than finally offering
procedural rights, grossly violate such rights—thus reinforcing the
original administrative evasion. The result is a dual evasion of rights.
The excuses for the evasion thus offer little consolation.
Administrative proceedings are not independent, evenhanded, or
otherwise fair; rights delayed are rights denied, especially when the
delay exhausts administrative defendants; the alleged expansion of
procedural rights is a distraction from the broader assault on such
rights; it is not impracticable to abolish or at least cut back on
administrative adjudication; and far from a cure, judicial review
doubles down on the evasion of procedural rights.
IX. AMBIDEXTROUS ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHANGED NATURE
OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
As a consequence of the administrative evasion of procedural
rights, the government now enjoys ambidextrous enforcement. The
government once could engage in binding adjudication against
Americans only through the courts and their judges. Now, instead, it
can choose administrative adjudication. In some instances, Congress
alone makes this choice; in other instances, it authorizes an agency,
such as the SEC, to make the selection. One way or another, the
government can act ambidextrously—either through the courts, with
their judges, juries, and due process, or through administrative
adjudication and its faux process.
The evasion thereby changes the very nature of procedural
rights. Such rights traditionally were assurances against the
government. Now they are merely one of the choices for government
in its exercise of power. Though the government must respect these
rights when it proceeds against Americans in court, it has the
freedom to escape them by taking an administrative path. Procedural
rights have thereby been transformed. No longer guarantees, they
are now merely options.
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The evasion of constitutionally guaranteed procedures thus has
profound consequences. Rather than simply allow government to
escape valuable procedural rights, it changes the very character of
such rights.
X. ADMINISTRATIVE POWER AS EVASION
The administrative evasion of procedural rights is only part of a
broader problem of evasion. In fact, all administrative power can be
understood as a mode of evasion, and this explains both its structure
and its trajectory.
In earlier scholarship, I have argued that administrative power is
extralegal power—in the sense that it imposes legal obligation not
merely through law (including the acts of courts), but through other
mechanisms.128 Another way of putting this, as I have also previously
argued, is that administrative power is a “Mode of Evasion”:
Being extralegal in the sense that it binds through edicts
other
than
law,
administrative
power
evades
constitutionally authorized paths of power. The central
evasion is the end run around acts of Congress and the
judgments of the courts by substituting executive edicts, thus
creating an alternative system of law, which is not quite law,
but that nonetheless can be enforced against the public.
That, however, is not all, for the evasion also gets around the
Constitution’s institutions and processes. When the
executive makes regulations, it can escape the constitutional

Hamburger, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 3, at 2. As I have made
clear there and elsewhere, this point about administrative power being extralegal has
nothing to do with whether it is authorized by statute. Id. at 23; Hamburger, Vermeule
Unbound, supra note 4, at 215-17.
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requirements for the election of lawmakers, for
bicameralism, for deliberation, for publication of legislative
journals, and for a veto, and when the executive adjudicates
disputes, it can sidestep most of the requirements about
judicial independence, due process, grand juries, petit juries,
and judicial warrants and orders. This judicial evasion is
especially troubling because it escapes almost all of the
procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution.129
In other words, evasion explains the basic trajectory and structure of
administrative power. It is an ever-expanding end-run around the
Constitution’s pathways and procedures.
But that is not all, for administrative power has also largely
evaded relatively formal administrative paths and procedures in
pursuit of ever less onerous mechanisms for agency lawmaking and
adjudication:
Thus, administrative legislation has developed as a cascade
of evasions—initially an evasion of law, but then a series of
evasions within administrative lawmaking. And this is very
revealing about administrative power. Both its structure and
its trajectory can be seen as a cascade of evasions. 130
Evasion reveals both the form of this power and its tendency over
time.131

Hamburger, Vermeule Unbound, supra note 4, at 209, quoting Hamburger, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 3, at 29 (quotation marks omitted).
130 Hamburger, Vermeule Unbound, supra note 4, at 210, quoting Hamburger, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 3, at 111 (quotation marks omitted). See
also Hamburger, Vermeule Unbound, supra note 4, at 225.
131 Incidentally, the notion of evasion is an incomplete but important initial step
toward understanding why Americans did not establish an equivalent of the
Rechtsstaat. Having had too much experience with administrative power, liberal
129
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The force of this explanation, which focuses on the flow of
power, becomes particularly clear when it is contrasted to an
explanation based in law or doctrine. For example, Adrian Vermeule
has recently emphasized that administrative power is the product of
the internal development of legal doctrine. 132 But this is odd. Of
course, almost all later doctrine tends to draw on earlier doctrine, and
of course this happens through a process of judicial reasoning. But
prior doctrine has never been very predictive about the structure or
trajectory of administrative power. Thurman Arnold noted that the
entire structure of administrative law was “equipped with noiseless
elevators and secret stairways, by means of which the choice was
always open either to take a bold judicial stand or make a dignified

Germans sought at least to subject it to a constitution and the regular courts, without
deference—this being what they called a Rechtsstaat. Although they failed to secure
this in the wake of 1848, they subsequently managed at least to get a weak version of
a Rechtsstaat, in which administrative power would be exercised in relatively law-like
ways, subject to fully independent administrative courts. Americans drew much from
the Germans, but not even the weak version of a Rechtsstaat, for whenever they
obtained one expansion of administrative power, they then sought to evade it with
less formal versions. Evasion is thus a partial hint as to why American administrative
power, although drawn largely from Germany, is so different from a Rechtsstaat. A
more complete explanation would have to include why so many Americans sought
the evasions, and this would ultimately require an exploration of sociological
questions, including issues of class, which cannot be pursued here. For the class
aspects of administrative power, see HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNLAWFUL?, supra note 3, at 367-75, 502-05; PHILIP HAMBURGER, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
THREAT 55-57 (2017). For the American failure to adopt a Rechtstaat, see Daniel R. Ernst,
Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter, and the American Rechtsstaat: A Transatlantic Shipwreck,
1894–1932, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 171, 173, 175–76, 184, 188 (2009).
132 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION (2016).
On another aspect of the problem, however, Vermeule’s scholarship is in accord
with mine. I have emphasized the judges’ “abandonment of judicial office.” See, e.g.,
HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?, supra note 3, at 316. Similarly,
Vermeule’s has written about “law’s abnegation,” by which he seems to mean the
judges’ abnegation. The difference is that Vermeule admires this development.
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escape.”133 And the doctrine is so complex and artificial that it does
not seem very revealing about the underlying reality of
administrative power. As I have argued in response to Vermeule:
The most basic mistake made by Vermeule is to view
“official theory”—primarily the APA and judicial
doctrines—as revealing about the underlying structure of
administrative power. Much of the APA and many judicial
doctrines serve to justify administrative power, and in
casting the realities of this power in legitimizing terms, the
APA and the doctrines may have some value as apologetics,
but not so much as a window into reality. Far from disclosing
the actual landscape of administrative power, the “official
theory” often obscures it. As put by Daniel Farber and Anne
O’Connell, there is a “gap between theory and practice,”
which leads to an “increasingly fictional yet deeply
engrained account of administrative law.”134
In contrast, the evasion thesis is illuminating. Indeed, it is the key to
understanding administrative power.
Gary Lawson aptly observes that America has witnessed “The
Rise and Rise of the Administrative State,” and this continual growth
of administrative power is no coincidence. 135 What drives
administrative power is not doctrine or other law, but power—a
power that overflows its constitutional banks, and then runs along
all sorts of ever-less-confining paths. But mere power, not exercised
through law, is . . . well, mere power. It is exactly what should not be
and, in fact, is not constitutional.

THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 5-6 (1935).
Hamburger, Vermeule Unbound, supra note 4, at 224-25.
135 Lawson, supra note 5.
133
134

2018]

ADMINISTRATIVE EVASION

965

CONCLUSION
Although administrative adjudication is conventionally justified
in terms of due process, it actually evades the Constitution’s
procedural rights—as illustrated here by jury rights and the due
process of law. And because courts accommodate administrative
power, the initial administrative evasion of jury rights and due
process is echoed in the courts themselves.
The administrative evasion of procedural rights has structural
consequences, for it gives the government ambidextrous paths for
enforcement. It thereby transforms the very nature of procedural
rights from constitutional guarantees into mere options for
government power.
This Article’s point about the evasion of procedural rights is part
of a broader thesis about the character of administrative power.
Although administrative power is presented in doctrine as an
expression of law, it can more accurately be understood as power—
a sort of power that flows in a cascade around one boundary after
another, including the structures, procedural rights, and other
freedoms established by the Constitution. Put succinctly,
administrative power is a mode of evasion.
The costs for civil liberties are profound. And nothing more
concretely illustrates the loss than the administrative evasion of
procedural rights.

